To ‘Canadianize’ Defence: Inefficiencies in Canadian Defence Procurement
Global security concerns are on the rise, with the invasion of Ukraine nearing its second year in February, and growing tensions surrounding Taiwan. While diplomatic efforts must be paramount, Canada must also be prepared in the event tensions heighten further.
When one thinks of significant military powers, Canada is nowhere near the top of the list. Despite this, the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) have earned a reputation for being well-trained professionals. Sadly, the CAF is saddled with aging or poor-quality equipment. Canadian Forces entered the conflict in Afghanistan with outdated or wrong equipment. They deployed to a desert/arid environment in Kandahar with green/forest camo, outdated tanks from the 1970s, World War II-built sidearms, and an outdated jet fighter, among others. In 2023, Canadian troops in Latvia had to privately purchase their own helmets.
Unfortunately, this phenomenon is not new. Inefficient defence procurement has plagued the Canadian military since Confederation. This inefficiency, in large part, has been brought on by various policies, all aiming to grow the Canadian defence industry.
Canadian soldiers left for Flanders in 1915 with uniforms, rifles and gear that were unfit for combat. In a nationalistic fervour, the Canadian Minister of Militia, Sam Hughes, wanted Canadian soldiers to be equipped with Canadian-made products, even if it meant placing his friends into high positions to get there.
Prime Minister Mackenzie King’s ‘Canadianization’ effort in WWII sought to supply Canadians with Canadian-made products (albeit without the political patronage and corruption that Hughes demonstrated decades earlier). While most Canadian arms and equipment were high quality, a Canadian defence industry had to be built from the ground up. Canadians were left underequipped in the early stages of the war, relegated to being supplied by British or American products.
Today the goal of growing the Canadian defence industry is done through the Industrial and Technological Benefits (ITB) policy. The ITB’s main requirement is that contractors must make investments in the Canadian economy, including investments equaling 100% of the contract’s value for projects over $100 million. An extensive Value Proposition Guide is provided to potential bidders for them to explain how their bid will benefit the Canadian industry. Because of these strict requirements, bidders have been reluctant to place high bids or even bid at all on Canadian contracts.
For example, the CAF has been trying to replace its WWII-era sidearms since the early 2000s. At first, the intention was that the winning bidder would allow for their design to be produced by Colt Canada. This led to difficulty attracting bids, as bidders did not want to share proprietary information with a firm they saw as the competition. Bid solicitation was eventually restarted, with the Sig Sauer P320 selected as the CAF’s new sidearm. But even this bid will not completely fulfill the CAF’s needs. The contract is only guaranteed to provide the CAF with 7,000 pistols when the CAF has stated that they will likely need 25,000 new pistols.
The desire to grow the Canadian defence industry has also stalled the replacement of the CF-18, an aging and obsolete Cold War jet fighter. Successive governments have been playing chicken with “will they or won’t they” in procuring the F-35 jet fighter as its replacement. The increasing costs of the fighter’s development have been an election issue in 2011 and 2015. Trudeau promised to back out and allow a competitive bidding process to select Canada’s new fighter. The government has committed to the F-35 anyways, for fear of Canadian firms losing out on F-35 development contracts. The CAF will not receive the new fighters until the 2030s when similar nations like Australia have started receiving theirs already.
I will not argue that CAF, or any nation’s military for that matter, should always have the latest and greatest equipment. What any professional needs are tools that are reliably consistent and fulfill the job requirements before them. Whatever this may be, procurement procedures and policy need to correspond with the political and strategic doctrines of the CAF and Canada as a middle power.
Therefore, Canadian defence procurement policy should seek to address these key points:
The most likely threats to Canada and its interests or commitments overseas
The CAF’s most effective responses to those threats
What the CAF needs to look like to provide that response and what support can be expected from allies
How much will it cost to equip the CAF for the above purposes
When will the costs be incurred?
The answers to these questions don’t always need to be clear and straightforward. In a changing world, what the answer is today could suddenly be the wrong answer tomorrow. Additionally, the politics of the day is a major determining factor of the direction defence policy will take. Elected politicians come and go, each with their own ideas. Government employees, while not as often as their elected counterparts, also experience turnover. This creates difficulty for defence procurement projects that extend over several election cycles.
And all of this is not to say that the goal to grow the Canadian defence industry should be abandoned. But there is such a thing as overstepping. When supplying your armed forces, the primary concern should be whether they can do their job with the tools they’re given. It shouldn’t be secondary.
In this case, the ends don’t justify the means.
Brayden Greenstein is a Master’s student at the University of Calgary’s School of Public Policy.